首页
中心概况
中心学者
学术动态
项目简介
学者文章
学术会议
人才培养
中心简报
人文论丛
数字资源
媒体传真
 
  培养信息  
  招生信息  
  培养信息  
  学位信息  
  常用下载  
 
您现在的位置: 首页 > 人才培养 > 培养信息 > 正文
  培养信息
我中心研究生朱智通在A&HCI期刊发表书评论文

2023年6月30日,武汉大学中国传统文化研究中心硕士研究生朱智通所作书评:Review of On the Philosophy of Confucian Gongfu发表于A&HCI期刊:《Dao:A Journal of Comparative Philosophy》(2023),其他两位作者是其导师张昭炜教授与美国Middle Georgia State University的George L. Israel教授。

undefined



Ni Peimin倪培民,On the Philosophy of Confucian Gonfu儒家功夫哲学论


Zhaowei Zhang, Zhitong Zhu, and George L. Israel


In the book under review, Ni Peimin倪培民 adopts a creative and argumentative approach by bringing together Confucianism ( or Ruism ), gongfu 功夫, and philosophy for reflection. By doing so, he expands the scope of the meaning of gongfu from its former focus on the cultivation of mind and human nature to encompass as well "the art of life" and "philosophy as a way of life." In fact, Ni Peimin defines gongfu primarily as the "art of life." As such, the spirit of Ruist thought, discourse on gongfu, and philosophy are integrated, and the implications of gongfu are broadened with respect to discursive domains and methodology.


For a long time, Ruist philosophy has yielded substantial achievements in the area of Confucianism. However, research on gongfu discourse has mainly focused on the field of Neo-Confucianism. Thus, few scholars have carried out systematic research that sets out from the role of gongfu in Ruism going back to classical times. In concert with the professionalization of philosophy in the West, philosophy has in a sense gradually lost the original practical and worldly concerns possessed by the traditions of ancient Greece, becoming instead a kind of academic theoretical discourse. Owing to the limited perspectives of previous research on the theory of gongfu and the relative reliance on the individual’s personal attainments for gongfu taining and transmission, philosophy that is specialized and takes rational argumentation as its principal method of understanding inclines toward leaving this dimension outside its bounds. Ni Peimin ' s research provides us with a new direction for approaching gongfu discourse. He no longer sets out from the perspective of narrow definitions of gongfu , rather expanding it to include several components, including gongfu 工夫(effort spent on training, discipline, or practice), gongfa 功法(method or style of practice), gongli 功力(practice abilities or virtuosity), and gongxiao 功效(the effects or functions of gongfu effort , methods , and abilities), bringing all these dimensions together into a more broadly defined approach to gongfu theory and discourse .


The study of Ruist gongfu is broadening areas for research on Chinese philosophy, providing new methodologies, and producing new theories of gongfu philosophy. Nr Peimin believes that the shift in philosophical inquiry toward gongfu is reflected in three dimensions of this scholarship. First, this trend broadens the areas for philosophical research by introducing "the learning of gongfu" as the fourth major field in philosophy alongside ontology, epistemology, and ethics. This new field for philosophical inquiry takes gongfu as its core concept, albeit defining its meaning broadly, exceeding narrower definitions of it in traditional theories of gongfu. By this definition, gongfu also encompasses the methods one employs, the process one goes through, the abilities or skills upon which one relies, and the attainments one reaches in cultivating mind and human nature as well as when applying that cultivation to practical life. Also, in the process, every person is called upon anew to act as the concrete practitioner, each possessing different virtuosities (gongli) and applying different styles of practice (gongfa), which consequently furthers study of the relationship between the subject and practice.


Second, the shift in focus to gongfu provides a new perspective and methodology for the field of philosophy, altering the meaning of objects for it. No longer will objects alone be regarded as real or cognition be treated as the observation of reality; rather, this process will be regarded as gongfa guidance for a Way of living, creating, and generating its pragmatic, artistic, and practical meanings. When "acquiring knowledge of truth" is no longer philosophy's sole purpose, its scope needs no longer be confined to the fields of epistemology, realism, and morality. A once disappearing understanding of philosophy as a way of life (that is, the gongfa guidance in gongfu discourse) can be returned to anew, thus enabling philosophy to return to its fundamental concern for the love of wisdom. Thirdly, the philosophical turn in gongfu can contribute to the development of gongfu philosophical theory, generating new philosophical problems and fields, such as critical perspectives on ontology, a gongfu epistemology that transcends cognizing truth, a religious philosophy of "as-if-ism"(ruzai zhuyi如在主義)transcending belief in a reality, and a gongfu ethics exceeding the scope of moral responsibility.


Conceptual analysis of and philosophical reflection on the theory of gongfu also serves to promote a shift toward philosophical reflection within gongfu discourse itself. The process is one of a systematic reconstruction of the Ruist theory of gongfu from the perspective of semantics, modes of discourse, and theoretical frameworks. For scholarship on Chinese philosophy, the philosophical shift toward gongfu discourse is an entirely new endeavor of great significance because it broadens the connotations of gongfu beyond the field of the Neo-Confucianism to what it meant for the entire development of the Ruist tradition, as well as further extending it to Daoist and Buddhist philosophy. However, gongfu discourse is somewhat of a different matter from common objects of philosophical inquiry because it has a "tacit dimension"( jianmo weidu 缄默維度)to it , pointing to deep tranquility and emphasizing embodied knowledge. Its many meanings cannot by any means be completely elucidated through normative modern philosophical discourse. As Ni Peimin explains, since the content of gongfu often possesses properties that cannot be described or analyzed, ensuring that its special function in the original linguistic context is retained in the construction of an academic system will be challenging for this emerging field of study. But regardless of the degree to which philosophical inquiry can articulate the meanings of gongfu discourse, it will surely encourage the theoretical development of gongfu discourse itself. The gongfu turn in philosophy and the philosophical turn in gongfu discourse will work together to constitute the formation of Ruist gongfu philosophy, permitting of a search for the spiritual meaning of Ruism and what has become obsolete in it, as well as offering a new path forward for Ruism, gongfu theory, and philosophy.


In constructing Ruist gongfu philosophy, Ni Peimin follows the sequence of eight steps in the Great Learning, that is, investigating things, extending knowledge, perfecting the genuineness of one's intentions, rectifying the mind, refining the person, aligning the household, ordering the state, and pacifying the world. He divides them into three parts. The first part discusses investigating things and extending knowledge, touching on gongfu and epistemology, ontology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of science. The second part discusses perfecting the genuineness of one's intentions, rectifying the mind, and refining the person, and touches on the ethics and aesthetics of gongfu. The third part discusses aligning the household, ordering the state, and pacifying the world, that is, dimensions of political philosophy pertaining to gongfu.


One can see from his use of this system for constructing his approach to gongfu that the organizational framework of the book is indeed quite comprehensive, including not only such fields central to philosophical inquiry as epistemology and ontology, but also aesthetics, religious studies, and ethics. Furthermore, insofar as he regards political practice as an external manifestation of gongfu, Ni Peimin directly encompasses it in his philosophical system of gongfu. This system first of all expresses the holistic nature of the identity of substance and function in the theory of Ruist gongfu, effectively avoiding problems raised by one-sided and partial interpretations of it. At the same time, it opens up new horizons for further research on the philosophy of gongfu. With the exception of coverage of matters of gongfu as it relates to the cultivation of mind and nature, the other areas encompassed by his systematic organizational framework are rarely if ever discussed in the field of gongfu discourse. Therefore, if we set out from the perspective of the philosophy of gongfu and reexamine these areas anew, we may come up with some new conclusions.


In his book, the author offers a new interpretation of Ruist classics based on gongfu philosophy. Traditional interpretation of these classics mainly relies on the styles of annotation and commentary or exegesis of correct meanings, while modern ones lean toward constructing a system of thought for framing interpretation. Gongfu philosophy, however, is to be distinguished from both, as it rather brings out the gongfu connotations of the classics. For example, the Doctrine of the Mean unveils the element of gongfu in the method of the mind in Ruism, reinterpreting such critical concepts as "centeredness and harmony," "holding to the middle ground," and "being genuine." Ni Peimin also points out (172) that the Doctrine of the Mean is essentially a work of advanced gongfu. Its advanced nature lies in penetrating the boundary between Heaven and man and the path (Dao道) of uniting the internal and external.


Another example is the Mengzi孟子.Traditionally, Mengzi ' s theory of the goodness of human nature includes the three dimensions of ontology, linguistics, and ethics , but Rujia gongfu zhexue lun highlights the dimension of gongfu. What is unique about this is that with a firm belief in the good nature of human beings, one can in a very fundamental way establish the will and cultivate the qi (vital energy). By doing so, a complementary version of the gongfu theory of both Mengzi and Xunzi can be realized, even if according to traditional interpretations their theories of human nature are mutually contradictory.


Yet another case is the Great Learning. Ni Peimin states (462), "Among the Great Learning's eight mutually linked and gradated, progressive steps of investigating things, extending knowledge, perfecting the genuineness of one's intentions, rectifying the mind, refining the person, aligning the household, ordering the state and pacifying the world, aligning the household is the crucial link between individual self-cultivation and social practice." The book under review devotes a chapter to discussing aligning the household, including such topics as the relationship between doing so and refining the person, authority and family regulations; aligning the household and what the Doctrine of the Mean calls "reach the greatest height and brilliance"; as well as aligning the household and contemporary family issues, ordering the state, and pacifying the world. Additionally, it should be noted that Ni Peimin has published both an English-language edition of the Analects with annoations and commentary and a monograph that interprets the Analects from the perspective of gongfu philosophy (Confucius: The Man and the Way of Gongfu [ Lanham: Rowan Littlefield ,2016]). As such, he has created new territory for the interpretation of gongfu discourse in Ruist classics.


Nevertheless, the book under review is lacking a deep exploration of the rich resources offered by Neo-Confucian gongfu theory. The explanations of moral self–cultivation, the status of desire, perfecting the genuineness of one' s intentions , and other content pertaining to gongfu theory primarily reference Confucius, Mengzi, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Great Learning. For gongfu theory in Neo-Confucianism , Zhu Xi朱熹 is regarded as a representative, and analysis touches on the transition from the "old theory of centeredness and harmony" to the "new theory of centeredness and harmony" in ZHu Xi, as well as the corresponding shift from the practice of emphasizing tranquility to maintaining reverence. However, Ni Peimin does not touch upon Zhu Xi's tendency late in his life to return to emphasizing tranquility in his gongfu theory, as well as the alternating complementarity of emphasizing tranquility and maintaining reverence in the course of the development of Neo-Confucianism. In fact, gongfu theory in the Neo-Confucianism of the Ming dynasty is notably lacking, such as the reversal of the importance accorded to maintaining reverence versus emphasizing tranquility in Song Ruism by the school of Chen Baisha 陳白沙 and Wang Yangming 王陽明.As for the unfolding of gongfu theory in the Neo-Confucianism of the Ming dynasty, the book would benefit from further exploration of collecting, preserving, and concentrating mind in the Jiangyou江右 branch of Wang Yangming followers, the flow and operation of liangzhi 良知 (the innate knowledge of the good) in the Taizhou branch, as well as a priori learning of rectifying the heart-and-mind in the Zhejiang branch.


The author also points out that the Ruist tradition does not hold the conviction that art only has value when it contributes to moral self-cultivation and education. A traditional standpoint whereby the Ruist pursues art as a means and moral self-cultivation as the end is a mistaken one. In fact, Ruism regards moral self-cultivation as a means and the realm of the aesthetic life as an end. Moreover, the ultimate good in the pursuit of moral-self-cultivation and beauty in the aesthetic life are united in this realm. However, this requires further exposition of the relationship between beauty and virtue, as well as exploration of the potential for beauty in the arts and the good in morality as the double arch stones for Ruist gongfu theory. In the tacit dimensions of Ruism, the double arch stones are expressed as the simultaneous arrival at great beauty in the arts and the ultimate good of morality. However, the path to beauty in the arts was primarily pioneered by Zhuangzi, and this makes it necessary to clarity the relationship between Zhuangzi and Ruism. Thus, the theory of gongfu cannot be limited to a " theory of Ruist gongfu philosophy." Of course, Mengzi's gongfu theory also encompasses conceptions of beauty in the arts, and Zhuangzi's philosophy contains a notion of the good in morality, thus requiring the integration of Mengzi and Zhuangzi.


Lastly, the author creatively reinterprets the Ruist gongfu of "renewing the people "(in the Great Learning) as a practice that can elevate the level of political participation on the part of the masses in a democratic political system. This approach is nearly the opposite of a traditional view that regards Ruist thought as a stumbling block to democracy and offers a further exposition of Ruist ideas about the relationship between the sovereign and people, as well as the relationship between ritual, virtue, and law in the traditional Chinese political system. Ni Peimin holds the conviction that there are aspects of Ruist thought that can adapt to and even support democratic political systems and provides as well further analysis of conceptions of democracy in modern times.


In sum, within the original gongfu framework of Ruism, On the Philosophy of Confucian Gongfu proceeds with an innovative arrangement. Gongfu is treated not merely as the observation of what truly exists but rather as instruction in training methods for a Dao of living. Moreover, from beginning to end, this important work never gives up the effort to theorize the implications of gongfu, and ultimately it constructs a relatively systematic gongfu philosophical system. Lastly, regarding "the art of life" and "philosophy as a way of life" as important, Ni Peimin's book provides a discursive space for the further development of gongfu philosophy.





本文首发于《Dao:A Journal of Comparative Philosophy》(2023)


原文链接:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11712-023-09902-x



作者简介

朱智通,武汉大学中国传统文化研究中心中国哲学专业2021级硕士研究生,师从张昭炜教授。本科毕业于中国人民大学哲学院政治学、经济学与哲学专业(PPE),已发表有《方以智思想世界的缄默维度》(《方以智研究》第三辑)、《第二期中国儒学缄默维度工作坊——三教视域下的儒学缄默维度》(《衡水学院学报》2022年第3期)等。获武汉大学2021-2022学年度优秀研究生、2022年武汉大学学术科技活动先进个人、武汉大学“人文社科经典导引”课程优秀助教等荣誉称号。


End